Chapter 11 CANADIAN PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION, CANADA:
A CAMPAIGN TO CHANGE PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OIL
INDUSTRY AND TO INFLUENCE
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY
When Lhe government of Pierre Truduou announced the formulation of
a new National Energy Policy on October 28, 1980, the Canadian Pe-
troleum Association (CPA) found itself confronted with an unprece-
dented Set Of Problems due to this bellweather shift in the nation's en-
ergy policy. Such a radical redirection was likely to airect all aspects of
the petroleum industry, from exploration to refining. and was seen as
rendering the entire industry infinitely more risky and less profitable.
Additionally, the CPA viewed as ominous the nationalistic orientation
of the NEP-an orientation that was likely to create a rift between Ca-
nadian and foreign Imostly American) companies, and between large and
small companies. Thus, the industry felt it had no choice but Lo present
its case to the Canadian public.
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Canadian Petroleum Associatwit: To Change Aftiludes and influence Uvivernifient
CAAADA'S NEW RATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (REP)
The government's goal was to increase Canadian ownership of its oil and
gas industry from 35 percent at that time to at least 50 percent by 1990.
The greatest foreign ownership was vested in the U.S.-controlled com-
panies. To accomplish its goals, the Canadian government announced a
new set of taxes, tax incentives, and grants to Canadian-owned oil and
gas companies. The intent of the policy was to provide benefits in direct
proportion to the Canadian share of ownership in a company. However,
the impact turned out to be quite the reverse. In reality. the tax bite
took away more from the Canadian companies because they were con-
centrated in the upstream operations, crude oil and gas exploration and
production. The American multinational oil companies were more in-
tegrated and could therefore absorb some or the adverse impacts of the
new taxes in their downstream operations, refining and distribution ser-
vices. In addition, the Canadian government kept the right Lo Lake, sub-
ject to some compensation, a retroactive 25 percent interest in all oil
and gas discovered an federal ]ands.
The government admitted that the NEP might be discriminatory in
the treatment or foreign investors in the oil and gas industry. Unlike
foreign investors in other industries that were regulated through the
Foreign Investment Review Agency (FERA), which had wide discretion.
the treatment or foreign investors under NEP was fixed in law. It should
be noted here that Canadian-owned companies were also subject to FERA
if they were to sell all or part of their assets to a foreign-owned company.
The energy policy brought opposition not only from the Conserva-
tive party. but also from the oil and gas industry. A major criticism of
NEP was that it would not help the Canadian petroleum industry. On
the contrary, in reaching its aim of nationalization. it would hurt all
companies working in the industry. James Deacey of the Canadian Pe-
Lroleum Association (CPA) states:
The one nice thing that the NEP has done is that it has hurt
everybody. . . . We do not disagree with Can ad we
disagree with the NEP's concept or Canadianization. It is the
method plus timing that gives us problems.
Alan Gregg, president of Decima Research, a leading opinion polling firm,
stated:
This policy is a revenue mission. The government has been
having revenue problems even before the election of the Liberal
Party. The Conservative Party, which was in power before the
liberals. admitted to it. The public reality is the question of
where is there a sector where we con grab something to assist
us in our revenue problem. Where is there a body or public
opinion that will allow that initial overture to be consistent
politically and popularly.
Prior to the announcement of the policy, the CPA conducted a public
opinion survey in Sep te rn be r- Oc Lobe 1980. The findings of the survey
showed confusion in the public mind about the energy situation in Can-
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Canadas New National Energy Policy (NEPI
ada. CPA therefore felt there was a need for the industry as a whole to
start getting involved in this area. Whereas before CPA's involvement
in public matters was at a relatively low level, the NEP changed all
that, and public atTairs became one of its major concerns.
Rowiand Frazee. chairman of the Royal Bank of Canada, said in his
address to the bank's annual meeting in January 1981:
It seems abundantly clear by now that it Ithe NEM ts so se-
riously flowed as to be a non-starter which should be with-
drawn and reconsidered. And in that reconsideration. let all of
the key players have reasonable input! We need consensus in
energy policy. not tablets from the Mount.
The CPA campaign offers an interesting set of issues for analysis
that are generally not found in most other situations where an industry
or a corporation is involved in public advocacy of a controversial social
issue.
1. In Canada, the government used all the avenues or free communi-
cation available to it to publicize its Views and persuade the general
public to agree to them. Although the Canadian government did not
resort to paid political commercials to propagate the NEP. there is
a long tradition in Canada ror the government's use or paid adver-
tising. What is the rationale and logic for a government engaging
in advocacy advertising in a democratic society, as opposed to a merely
informational campaign, and what are its smiopolitical implica-
tions?
2. The Canadian petroleum indus" is dominated by foreign owner.
ship, mostly American. The NEP had a distinctly nationalistic ori-
entation. Under these circumstances, how can an industry aswia.
tion develop a cohesive communications strategy that meets the
apparently conflicting needs of its member companies, and at the
same time is not viewed as foreign-dominated or antinationalistic?
3, What are some of the organizational and operational problems con-
fronted by such an association that might adversely affect its lob-
bying, positioning on public policy issues, and public education er-
forts?
4. What are some of the strategic alternatives available to foreign mul-
tinationa) corporations that engage in public debate and lobbying on
issues where their concerns might be viewed as contrary to those or
locally owned companies, or policies advocated by the host country
government?
In addition to overall strategy, the case also presents some inter-
e3ting dimensions of tactics that set it &part rrom other advertising ap-
proaches to advocacy Campaigns that are more prevalent in the United
States.
The design and implementation of CPA campaign strategy was al-
most identical to advertising campaigns used ror product advertising,
especially those of packaged consumer goods. 'Me campaign had the heavy
involvement of outside agencies. both market research and advertising.
in all phases of strategy development and implementation. It relied heavily
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Canadian Petroleum Association: To Change Attitudes alLd Influence Government
on Field and laboratory research for all aspects of the campaign and used
ad techniques designed to measure audience responses similar to those
for product advertising associated with new product introductions.
The CPA campaign, therefore, presents a sharp contrast to the al.
ternative approach to advocacy advertising, which argues that selling
an abstract and complex idea, and one with strong public policy con.
notations, is quite different rrorn selling products. The CPA campaign
suggests that this type or "selling" can be packaged and moved in es.
sentially the same manner as ordinary products, and by those who are
experts in mass merchandising techniques.
THE POLITICAL ENVIROMMENT OF THE REP
The energy issue became prominent in Canada with the OPEC oil em.
bargo in 1973-74. AL that time, Canada was self-sufficient in oil. Wb"
it exported oil to the United States from the western provinces, it i.,.-
ported a roughly equal amount to meet the needs or its eastern prov-
inces. This approach was desirable to save on the transportation costs
of moving oil from western to eastern Canada.
After the oil embargo, two issues concerned the Canadian govern-
ment. (1) How much should Canadian consumers pay for domestically
produced oil? (2) Who should control Canada's petroleum industry?
The Canadian government chose a policy that would charge the
United States the world price for Canadian oil exports, and use the ex-
cess money after taxes to subsidize oil imports for eastern Canada. This
policy was intended Lo stabilize domestic oil prices and protect Canadian
ngumen from rising world oil prices.
co
However, the policy did not yield the desired effect, because or sev-
eral factors. First, many or the major Canadian oil companies were shift-
ing their efforts in oil and gas exploration From Canada to the United
States, due to the higher net return in the United States. This caused
two problems: (1) There was a reduction in oil and gas exploration in
Canada. (2) It caused an unstable situation inside Canada due to corn-
peting revenue claims from provinces (owners of the resource) and tho.
federal government, which ultimately led to increases in domestic
prices.
The second problem pertained to the tax incentive plans contained
in the energy policy, Prior to the NEP. one or the primary incentives
for investing in the oil and gas industry was provided through the in-
come tax system. It allowed producers to defer taxes if profits were rein-
vested in exploration in Canada. This policy worked in ravor of larger
companies; smaller companies did not take advantage or the available
income tax writeoiTs. And yet they had relatively limited opportunities
outside Canada and were the ones who were left to do exploration in
Canada.
The third area involved the activities or the foreign-owned sector of
the oil industry. which was concentrated in Alberta. The foreign own-
ersh ip, mostly American, in this strategic commodity was very high- L;-.
approximately 70 to 75 percent. The foreign oil companies were oper-
ating in a more advantageous situation as companies compared to the
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The Political Environment of the NEP
Canadian-owned companies. In addition to the advantage of size, they
were not limited to activities in oil and gas areas alone and were in-
vesting in mining, manufacturing, real estate, and other Canadian in.
dustries. The federal government or Canada believed that by the turn
of the century, there would be a disproportionate amount of wealth con-
centration in Alberta, controlled by the provincial government.
Oil Policy and Electoral Politics
Energy policy in the oil and gas industry in Canada was directly influ-
enced by the campaign strategies of the ruling Liberal party. In 1974,
the Liberal party's leader, Pierre Elliott Trud-eau, won. the national elec-
tions with is large majority. The party had been a strong supporter of
social welfare programs and economic nationalism, both of which were
designed to appeal to large segments of the Canadian population. How-
ever, by 1980 it was losing public confidence because of its inability to
improve Canada's economic situation, which was by then beset by high
inflation, unemployment, economic slowdown, and rising taxes.
The defeat of the Liberal party in the June 1979 elections brought
to power the Conservative party under the leadership of Prime Minister
Joe Clark. The victory was, however, very short-lived. Due to a series
of blunders in handling the economic situation, the Clark government
was defeated on a no-confidence motion in Parliament, and Joe Clark
resigned less than nine months after he took office.
The Conservatives had come to power with the promise of lower in-
terest raw and a cut in taxes to stimulate economic growth. And yet
the first budget of the now government focused attention on cutting gov-
ern men deficits and spending by imposing an excise tax an oil of 18
cents per gallon, higher energy prices, and failure to provide tax relief
for lower-income Canadians. To the public, it appeared a betrayal or trust
The Conservative party bad failed to gauge the public mood. The op-
position parties, despite their own dismal performance when in power,
coalesced in opposition, When the federal budget was presented in Par-
liament it was defeated, and with it came the end of the Conservative
government.
In the 1990 election, energy was again a significant campaign issue.
Convinced that its approach to economic issues was right, the Conmr-
vative party again advocated an oil self-sufficiency program that would
require an excise tax of 18 cents per gallon of gasoline. 'Me excess money
was to go into a self-sufficiency fund to be used for direct investment.
loans. and loan guarantees aimed at achieving oil self-sufficiency. The
Conservative party also proposed to privatize Petro Canada, a govern.
ment-owned or Crown corporation. Trudeau criticized the Conservative
party's proposal as riding on the backs of the poor. His program would
establish a blended price for consumers which would be lower than the
one advocated by the Conservative party. That program became the cor-
nerstone of the Liberal campaign.
Trudeau, knowing he would win the election with a clear majority,
delivered a very strong speech on economic nationalism, thereby setting
the general tone for the formulation or the NEP. The Liberal party won
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Canadian Petroleum Association: To Change Attitudes and Influence Government
the election or 1980. After Trudeau's election, the price of gasoline went
up to 43 cents a liter, which was much more than the Conservatives had
proposed. The basic element that defeated the Conservatives, apart from
a general appearance of incompetence, was the specific issue of energy
policy. During their term in oMce, Use Liberals were able Lo arrive at
an energy agreement with Alberta; the Conservatives were not. The
Conservatives also attempted several policies regarding Petro Canada.
albeit unsuccessfully. Public opinion surveys showed that in the public
mind, the government had failed to resolve the two critical issues, fed.
eral-provincial relations and energy policy, and that had caused people
to switch their votes to the Liberal party.
The Public Relations Effort by the Government of Canada
The government of Canada has always been skillful in the use or -d-
Vert Just prior to NEP, during the spring and early WI of . .0,
the government started with a campaign stating that Canada was en-
ergy self-sulTicient. The entire thrust of the campaign was focused an
the profits or the oil companies, mostly multinationals.
Ken Colby, formerly the national political correspondent of the Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Company and currently vice-president of govern-
ment affairs or NORCEN Energy, the second largest Canadian-owned
oil company, observed:
There has been a long hintory in the Government's use of
unpaid mass media and 'paid' advertising to promote its poi-
icies. It has been. for a long time. a good too] for the Govern.
ment of Canada to attract the support of the public. One of the
examples of media manipulation occurred in 1978 at the time
of the Iran revolution and the resultant fear of another oil cri-
sis. When the United States was short of oil, a tanker bourid
for Halifax carrying oil from the Middle East. and owned by
the Exxon Corporation, was diverted to a United States port.
Imperial Oil [Exxon's Canadian subsidiary) tried manfully to
explain that this was part of the Exxon pool and Canada ben-
erited from the Exxon pool in having a diversity arsourcet se
oil was more pressing there and it was simply going to be re-
placed. In reality it was not a diversion of Canadian oil bound
for Canada. However, the Federal Government chose to portray
it as such. The media portrayed it as a diversion of Canadian
oil and the public perception simply persisted that Exxon had
taken away Canadian oil to give it to the Americans.
It was 25.000 barrels at oil, a mere drop in the bucket. Thaes
'what they were talking about. But it became headlines for a
month. It became part of speeches by the Liberals. When the
Liberals were in opposition. several Conservative cabinet min-
isters were taunted in the House of Commons--being called the
Minister or Exxon, or the spokesman ror big oil. It became a
real political football. It is just ludicrous. but it was probably
the most dramatic event.
An interesting point to note here is that Imperial Oil tried
to respond to this attack with facts and figures and a legalistic
argument and an explanation or the Exxon pool. But it is much
clearer and more attractive to the publir, ifyou deal in slogans.
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The Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA)
The slogan was: "The diversion of Canadian oil by the giant
Exxon Corporation or New York.' That was it. People doin't know
what 25.000 barrels Of Oil is. There is no frame of reference for
that. Imperial Oil decided that the only response they could
make was to have its CEO Armstrong appear in a meeting with
the ministry; )et him have a go at that. and hope that the issue
would go away. Well, in the Atlantic Provinces of Canada that
are captives of foreign oil, it was very much an issue that, cou-
pled with the Conservatives' plan for dismantling Petro Can.
ads, meant that the Tories were virtually wiped out orAtlentic
Canada. It was a very very large political issue. Whether Exxon
bungled it or not is beside the point. The industry was contin-
ually placed in a defensive posture.
An example of the Canadian government engaging in paid political
propaganda could be found in the government's (Liberal party) efforts to
sell the Canadian public on the sweeping changes in the Canadian Con-
stitution advocated by the ruling Liberal party, but opposed by many of
the provinces of western Canada. Ironically. the reasons given by the
government for the need for such advertising were similar to those ad-
vanced by private users of paid political-advocacy advertising- that the
public does not understand this complex issue; that the news media do
not explain it adequately; and that therefore we must undertake to ed-
ucate the public in a controlled and hospitable communication environ-
ment. Strange as it may seem, most of the public 'education' on this
.complex' issue was done through 30-second spot commercials.
THE CAMADM PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION (CPA)
Members of CPA have been exploring and developing Canada's oil and
natural gas resources since the industry's earliest days in western Can.
da. The industry was drawn together by common needs and interests
:nd just thirteen years ago, following the discovery Of oil in Turner Val-
ley, the Alberta Oil Operators Association was formed. As the industry
grew and its activities broadened, so did those of its association. The
association's name also evolved to reflect its broader role. In 1952, the
organization reached the basic form it uses today, and the current name
was adopted.
The industry and the association continue to grow as Canada's
northern and offshore frontiers are explored and &3 unconventional re-
sources like the Alberta oil sands are developed. Today CPA has offices
and staff in seven provinces. Its major responsibilities include helping
to inform the Canadian public about critical energy issues, preparing
technical and analytical submissions on behalf of the industry to gov-
ernment agencies, and gathering and disseminating operating, eco.
nomic, and policy information for members. The active membership of
CPA is comprised of companies engaged in Canada's oil and natural gas
industries (other than as contractors, suppliers, or marketers), and in-
cl udes most major pipeline companies. CPA's members produce mom than
80 percent of Canada's crude oil and about two-thirds of its natural gas.
In addition, some 90 companies that support industry activity in a va-
riety of ways are associate members.
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Canadian Petroleum Association: To Change Attitudes and influence Government
The Decision-Making Process
It was not until afLer the election or the new Trudeau government that
the Canadian Petroleum Association set up a meeting to investigate the
issue that would affect the association and the industry. Previously. the
oil industry was involved only in advertising its products. The govern-
ment started with a campaign (not paid commercials) stating that Can-
ads was se I r- nu MI Cie The entire thrust of the government campaign
was on the profits of the oil companies-mainly multinational oil corn.
panies-through the news media. At that time, company profits were
going up quite dramatically. The campaign was a careful orchestration
of events leading to a restructuring of the industry-NEP.
Ile CPA realized that it had to do something to respond to the threat
of NEP. which it felt was not only injurious to the industry. but also
potentially harmful to Canada itself. However, in developing an effec-
tive response strategy it faced some unusual problems because of the
composition or its membership, and the highly differential effect P
was going to have on its different member companies. On the issue or
NEP, however, the industry round itself quite united. and the emergent
industry position vis-a-vis NEP was common in the petroleum industry.
There was not a Canadian position versus a U.S. position.
The Campaign Strategy
CPA's campaign had four objectives:
1. A correction in the public's understanding as to who is responsible
and who does what in the energy field
2. A statement of what the government is proposing to do under the
National Energy Policy
3. A method whereby the public can judge government performance of
Its stated goals in a different light
4. The offering of a social contract by the industry to the Canadian
public
The tone or the campaign throughout would be evenhanded and
tual. CPA would avoid being perceived as I.moaners, criers, whinam' or
earnest advocates, and would strive to be taking the high road, to be
nonadversariaL and nonaggressive. ,
In addition, CPA would carry out a full public affairs program, which
would include elements of lobbying, a speakers' bureau, and general public
affairs activities such as internal and external communications pro-
grams, detailed analysis of government activities, and a wide variety of
activities to place its case before the Canadian public.
Strategy Implementation
The one unique argument in the meeting of the board of CPA was the
choice between going to an advertising agency or, for the first time, cre-
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The Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA)
ating its own ad agency within the CPA. Because the campaign was a
political one, it was believed that no existing Canadian agency expertise
was available to undertake such work and do a better job from the point
of view of cost and quality control. The project was quite ambitious in
scope and potential impact; no other Canadian industry association had
undertaken a project of this type or magnitude. Therefore, CPA believed
it would be hard to find an agency with the requisite experience, per-
sonnel, or ability to do the job.
The other argument against hiring an agency was economic. Any
agency would work on a basic markup of 18 percent. The campaign was
budgeted at about $ million, Therefore, it would cost almost $2 million
to hire the best agency, while it would cost much less if the association
could hire even the best individuals to do the job for it. There was a
potential for some significant economies to be achieved it CPA were, in
effect, to create its own agency for the implementation of this campaign.
Therefore, it was decided that CPA would create a project team, con-
siating of the best people in the business, who would respond through
an organization chart to the staff, board members, and other interested
parties. This process was akin to an established practice among political
parties in preparing for elections.
This way there was a guaranty of quality control; the use or the
best ad talent in Canada, and significant savings for CPA to use for
more media buying. In order to do such a project, there was also a need
for cooperation between CPA and other associations, such as the Petro-
leum Resources Communication Foundation (PRCF), die Independent
Petroleum Association of Canada (IPAC), and the Canadian Association
of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC).
CPA Advertising Structure
The functions and operating structure for the proposed advertising cam-
paign were determined as follows:
Program Coordinator. One person would be added to the CPA staff
with strong advertising competence whose job would be to Act 83 the
.client' on a day-to-day basis with other outside professionals working
on the campaign. This would be his sole responsibility, and he would
report through the executive director to the steering committee.
Steering Committee. Membership in this group was comprised of the Jr
chairman, vice-chairman, public affairs chairman, finance committee
chairman, and the executive director, and any other industry association
that opted to contribute significantly to the program Financially. This
committee was to set overall strategy and content for the campaign, give
final approval to the creative execution, and evaluate overall perfor. ?
mance. However, as the campaign progressed and the members became
more comfortable with the work of the CPA staff, this committee was
de facto merged into the regular CPA decision-making structure.
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Canadian Petroleum Association: To Change Attitudes and Influence Government
Industry Image Study
The First step in creating a supportive public constituency was a public
opinion study. The focus or this study was not to answer the question of
what people thought or the industry, which was quite apparent. but why
the public held such a low opinion of the industry. The survey was con.
ducted by Decima Research of Toronto, a company known for political
research. They were the pollster-i or the Conservative party of Canada
and those of many other provinces. The principal involved was Alan Gregg,
a political strategist with strong Conservative party political connec.
tions.
The research was conducted during September-October 1980. It was
telephone survey of 1,190 Canadian citizens IS years or age and older
:nd representative of the Canadian population. The interview lasted ap-
proximately 45 to 60 minutes and contained 133 questions.
The findings showed that the public did not have a good image or
oil companies because they thought of oil companies as financially d,
honest or unfair in setting prices and as socially unaccountable. People
did not believe that oi I companies were good communicators or good pub-
lic affairs specialists. The study also showed that people wanted more
information about the petroleum industry; the public was Con [used ('no-
body's telling the truth), and most important, was very likely to adopt
a more positive attitude toward the industry ir information was made
available in a forthright but nonconfrontational style. Research also in-
dicated that a successful information program, aimed at broadening and
increasing public knowledge and understanding of the industry, would
make future government expansion (at the industry's expense) signifl-
cantly more difficult than would be the case given a continuation of ex-
is cl rig public attitudes and opinion trends. Additionally, it showed that:
There were certain area@ where there Wes a shared feeling of
disbelier and confusion among people. These areas consisted of
lack of understanding as to whether it was business or the gov-
ernment who set prices. or which one could run the industry
more efficiently, or whether business or government could de-
liver the product more inexpensively
Finally, the research indicated that the major means or achieving a
shift in public attitudes would be a mass communication program based
on a national advertising campaign, with heavy emphasis on television,
and aimed at urban populations in the 18-45 age group.
The Communication Strategy
In June 1981, the senior staff of the CPA held a meeting for the purpose
of considering the issues and problems confronted by the industry and
devising a campaign to change public opinion. It was argued that the
federal government was systematically increasing its presence in, and
direct control or, the petroleum industry at the expense of virtually all
participants in the industry. Through a carefully orchestrated campaign,
which appeared designed first to manipulate public opinion and then to
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The Campaign
respond to the climate or opinion it had thus created, the federal gov-
emment had engineered a progressively larger role for itself at both Po.
litical and bureaucratic levels.
The CPA board decided that the problem facing the industry was a
political problem, and that the industry had to take steps to change pub-
lic opinion. The communication problem was squarely rooted in the po.
litical problem. As long as the public held a low opinion of the industry,
the industry would be defenseless. The attitudes of the public about the
industry had to be changed in order to give people greater political power
and ability to influence the government in energy policy matters.
What the industry needed was to create between then and the time
of the next general election a constituency or a perception of a constit-
uency. It was clear to the board that if the industry did not create a
measurable political constituency by the time of the next election (35 to
50 percent of the Canadian population should agree with the oil industry
on most of its public policy initiatives), then following the 1984 general
election, the industry would cease to exist as a private industry. If not
actually nationalized, it Would Most probably operate as a highly reg-
ulated utility. Observed one CPA executive-
We were determined not to be such an easy picking as we were
in the last round. no public will know more of what we do and
how we do it and why we do it. We cannot count an any polit.
ical party to leave us alone. I mean, there are many people in
the Conservative Party who would take positions an the NEP
just as hard or harder than Liberals can. There 13 no doubt in
my mind that no political party would turn back the clock an
the NEP.
THE CAMPAIGN
Based on the detailed analysis of the public opinion survey conducted
by Decime, CPA's executive committee, at its meeting on December 9,
1980, directed the CPA staff to report on: (a) the specific targets to be
achieved through an industry-sponsored advertising program; and (b) the
total costs associated with such a program.
Three major premises were a springboard for delineating the carn-
paign:
- 'Me petroleum industry faced a political problem that required a sig-
nificant change in public opinion between then and the end of 1983.
. Public opinion could be moved, given appropriate 'reach' and fre-
quancy of messages, and assuming acceptable levels of creativity and
shapine of messages.
. The data available to the CPA through previous research correctly
identified those publics whose opinion could be changed and the mes-
sages which were necessary to secure that change.
A mixed media campaign was suggested, with the greatest portion
going to TV, but also using magazines, newspapers. radio, and other ve-
hicles as the development of the creative message dictated.
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Canadian Petroleum Association: To Chajige Attitudes and Influence Guvernment
By March 1981, CPA staff, in cooperation with the Decima Re-
search. LTD., and McLaughlan, Mohr and Massey Ltd., advertising
agency, developed a basic strategy document that subsequently became
the foundation or all actions pertaining to advertising and other public
affair3 activities. A summary of the document follows.
Announcement of the Campaign
There were two obvious possibilities to consider concerning the level of
attention the CPA wanted to attract surrounding the campaign launch.
The first was the option of simply buying advertising time and placing
ads with no announcement. The second option was for the CPA to re-
lease, in some manner, the rationale for the program. The CPA chose
the latter option, because:
It felt that it would be impossible to avoid comment on the program
CPA should attempt to be out front, instead of appearing to be re-
acting to a situation created by others.
Its communications goals would be furthered by explaining the need
for information at the start of the program.
CPA would be able to condition the public, to some degree, to the
essence of its message by actively announcing its rationale.
The free media and the credibility to be gained from the 'news' for-
mat as opposed to paid advertising were considered important.
Target Audience5 and Markets
The focus of the campaign was on the same groups that had caused the
Liberal government to be elected. Consequently, CPA had identified the
key target groups as all adults above the age of 18, with special em-
phasis an people 25 to 49 years old, middle-income earners with above-
average levels of education. The campaign was timed for the period be-
tween March 1981 and December 1984. The weight and placement of
the advertising would reflect both the largest target markets and CPA
major problem areas. This ranking was- the provinces of Ontario, At-
lantic/Quebec, Manitoba/Saskatchewan/B.C.. and Alberta.
The campaign had four ph es:
Phase 1. Develop credibility and legitimacy for campaign through fac-
tual, low-key messages that address public concerns.
Phase H. Establish public benefits that derive from industry activities
and broadea image of industry.
Phase III. Move to progressively hard factual information messages
at a pace consistent with credibility and the public's willing-
ness to listen, eventually explaining respective roles and re-
sponsibilities of government and industry.
Phase IV. When pubues information base is adequate to evaluate our
position, state industry's me for change in treatment by
govemmenL
V
348
9OZ9[200c-
BATCO document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

The Campaign
Campaign Costs
The total campaign costs for September 1981 through December 1984
amounted to $10.744,400, divided as follows:
Res ca rch/Crecin ue
Total Costs Direct Production /
Time Period I million) Media Administration
Sept. 81-June 82 $3.759 $60.9 $39.1
July 82-June 83 2.890 65.4 34.6
July 93-Dec. 84 1.325 64.2 35.8
Jan. 84 Dec. 84 2.800 60.7 39.3
Media Schedule
For television, a very heavy initial segment was used for the first 10
weeks to give a reach of over 65 percent of the adult population of On-
tario with a Frequency meswge of 2.5 times per week. This was to de-
cline but remain reasonably constant for the rest of the year at a level
of about 55 percent of the adult population.
The magazine portion or advertising consisted of 10 or more na-
tional English and French magazines using. over the course of the year,
a total or 77 pages of ropy and having reached 89 percent of their read.
ers 15 times. For newspapers, coverage included 49 dailies in 24 markets
over the year, placing 9 messages in each. Estimated readership was
over 9 million for the" dailies.
Major communicators already active were carried over to phase 11,
thereby reducing creative and production costs. However, media pene-
tration was somewhat lower because of the 15 percent inflation factor
in media costs. The entire phase II campaign was comprised almost en-
tirely of 'IO TV ads, with a small amount Of secondary media.
For both phases III and IV, the media mix was similar to that em-
ployed in phase 1.
During the penod July-December 1983, the media buy for televi-
sion was reduced from a nationwide buy to one that covered the target
areas: Metro Toronto, the balance of Ontario, French-speaking Quebec,
and British Columbia.
'Me January-December 1984 period saw another change in media
scheduling. Because of a smaller budget for media buys, the television
commercials were confined to spring and fall periods only. At this stage,
there was growing concern that a decreasing level or weight and fro-
quency in exposures would adversely affect public awareness of and at-
titude toward industry message&
Other Communication Programs
Other than direct advertising through the media, a number of programs
backed up the adverusing-
.74.
t-w 9
ZOZ81HOS
BATCO document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Canadian Petroleum Association: To Change Allitudes and Influence Government
1. Speakers bureau. CPA would actively seek appropriate forum's for
industry spokepersons, prepare speeches, and rind opportunities to
reinforce those speeches. These activities were like a political cam-
paign.
2. Lobbying. Lobbying consisted of communicating with members of the
House of Common3, contacting other rompanies and getting their
reaction to NEP, identifying constituencies for these companies'ac-
tivities, and identifying constituencies or House members to be lob.
bied.
3. Public affcurs activities. These included working with companies to
develop internal communications and participation plans for em-
ployees; developing line-by-line responses to the National Energy
Program, including identification of fallacies and accuracies; devel-
oping new publications to reflect the overall public affairs strategy;
identifying in each member company a National Energy Plan co-
ordinator and trying to ascertain the level of U.S. parent company
reaction.
EXECUTING THE CAMPAIGN
Development of TV Commercials
Because of the long lead times on television production, the development
of material ror that medium was emphasized. This did not mean. how-
ever, that other print media were neglected; it was estimated that they
would come on stream very quickly once television development moved
ahead. The purpose of the TV advertising was to reach people and com-
municate better through the development or four separate creative tracks,
each delivering essentially the same message, but Using different visual
techniques.
One more important factor in this matter, 'was the choice of 3p.okes-
men. It was felt that the person must have a background in the industry,
but should not be a chief executive officer of an oil company because
people believe that chief executives know all the answers, but would not
tell.'
An initial set of criteria was established. The selected person 3hou.
be:
Identifiably Canadian (although international stature would not hurt)
Not a familiar advertising face
Fortyish, masculine, with equal appeal to men and women
Have a distinctive, authoritative voice that is also friendly
A careful search suggested ten potential candidates. One of these
was Ken Colby, who at that time was director of government relations
for NORCEN. As a political correspondent for the Canadian Broadcast-
ing Company, he had become a nationally recognized figure and had a
highly positive public image. At first Ken was reluctant to accept the
assignment, because he might be perceived as a 'hired mouthpiece, .
thereby impugning his integrity and lowering his public credibility. An
350
Li
20/2 I 2009
BATCO document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Executing the Campaign
added concern was the impact it might have on his employer, NORCEN
Energy, which had extensive dealings with various federal and pro-
vincial government agencies. However, after careful consideration, and
with the consent of NORCEN's chief executive, he accepted the assign.
ment.
Television Advertising Problems
The first set of commercials was rejected by the CBC, but the other TV
channels accepted it. CPA was concerned that it would not get the op-
portunity to have its commercials shown on CBC. In Canada, all com-
mercials are submitted to the commercial acceptance departments of the
two networks (CBC and CTV), which evaluate them for acceptability
based on guidelines approved by the Federal Commission. The networks
reject Commercials that deal with controversial topics, which are con-
sidered part of their news agenda, and have on occasion even rejected
commercials sponsored by the Canadian govemmenL However, after some
changes, four commercial tracks were accepted for broadcast (Exhibits
1-41. These were:
Track One-Spokesman on Site: This would be a aeries or spots with
an on-camera announcer delivering the message from such places
as a tar sands plant or an offshore oil rig.
Track Two- Family. This would be a series of spots shot in household
situations and showing the importance of oil in our everyday lives
and for our children.
Track Three-Symbols. This would be a series or spots in which the'
verbal message would be supported by symbolic devices such as oil
barrels. '
Track Four--Oa People. This would be a series of commercials in which
we actually get to meet people in the oil industry doing all kinds of
jobs at all kinds of levels in all kinds of places while the CPA mes-
sage is being delivered.
FlAnt Ads
The campaign included three print ads. Two were captioned at the bot-
tom with 'Energy solutions begin with understanding," while the third
captioned 'Economic solutions begin with energy.-
The first ad was titled 'We asked Canadians how they would de@
scribe the country's current energy situation. The answer: 'Confusing."
The message conveyed the notion that the energy situation was not a
crisis, but a challenge. It suggested that Canada was not confronted with
an imminent energy crisis, but that in the longer run Canadian3 would
have to face the question of security of oil supply. It was possible for
Canada to become se I f- 3 uffic in the years ahead, but the achieve-
ment of that goal would be influenced by decisions made now and in the
near future [Exhibit 51.
CD
co
.7.51
CD
BATCO document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Exhibit 2
Canadian Petroleum Association
Oil Change
Television 30 seconds
-S
Richt now, Canadians consume So I I @ people are
ne rly two , I , bar-els of concerned about.
oil each day.
r
oil policies, oil prices and oil At the Canadian Petroleum
supplies for the future. Association, we're concerned
too
So we're going to do our best Because we believe energy
V, to help you understand about solutions begin with
the ci; and gas aszoec, o' energy. understanding.
CD.
CD
M
00
BATCo document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Exhibit I
Canadian Petroleum Association
Sookesmar /Off shore ;ti,
60 Second,
r
it
w nt to talk to you about Mae
energy. In fact, more I'm speaking (or the Canadian We think we're good at our
"cifirally about oil and gas, Petroleum Association and its
more than 70 member companies
who produce around Sol of
Canada's oil and gas.
But recently, we d;scovereid We conducted a survey to (Ind Wt share Your concern over
Something that we haven't out how Canadians felt about 'he current confusion about
been quite 30 good at ...
communicating with Canadians. the whole energy question. *mergy ... because decisions
YOU told Us you felt confused being made right no. can
and frustrated. . . that you affect e@erybody-s future.
wanted same clear and accurate
information.
SO Ircm now on, we're going Because we believe energy
40 1:10 *Air best to help you solutions begin with
understand more about the
Oil and gas SsPe--t Of energy. Understanding.
352 OD
BATCo document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Exhibit 3
i
Canadian Petroleum Association
Pumpjack
Television 60 seconds
0011=-
A got of people in Canada are Well, they've got good reason Yes we are running out or this
con(used about -nether or not to be con f ed-because the kind of oil. Oil that's relatively
this country is jnn4ng out of answer is Uye, ... and no. easy and inexpensive to get out
P- oil.
Of the ground.
But we do have other kinds of That other kind of oil, Right now, Canada is facing
oil. In the oil sands, ir% the however. is difficult to decisions involving hundreds
Arctic and beneath the ocean get at and expensive to of bdhowi of dollars that will
floor. Enough o,: lo last us get out. determine when and how much
for several hurdred years.
of that other kind of oil will
be available for use.
At the Canadian Petroleum So we're doing our best to
Association. we lh.nk better help you understand more
energy d,,c.s,ons can be made about the oil and gas aspect
when e@e-ybody understands of energy. Because we believe
the racts.
energy solutions begin with
understanding.
'-7Z)
354
00
BATCo document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Exhibit 4
Canadian Peti-cleum Association
Streeter 1122
Tele@,slon 30 seconds
A
'Pec-p-le do not and never will "I don't beheve what the
trus: the major oil Companies' government s telling us.'
'No one seems to know how 11 read the paper every ri;q@t
but I become more confused
much of the profits should
go to -tie respective each time.
gcvernmerits and how much
should go to the oil companies.'
At the Canadian Petroleum Canadian Petroleum Association
Assoctai,on. we're concerned
about to,-,ay's emergy confusion
because t could affect all of us
tomarro. So we're go,ng to try C)
to tell o, more about the oil
and ga; aspect of energy. We C)
tefieve energy solur-ons begin co
with U"c..'standing
_Ij
la 14 April 1999
BATCO document for Province of British Columb
----------------

Lxhlbit 5
We asked Camdians how
ffiey wDWd describe the COM Ty
current energy situation.
'The answer:
confiising.
We are the Canadian Petroleum A&swation- We're
made up of rare Om se-enty merniser companies
and together we produce about 80% of Cardidas
ott and natural gas.
Recently, we commissioned 2 Canada-wide study to
see now people leit about the whote energy question.
The results, to put it mildDy, were startling.
people said
study told its how people feel
about the cciuntry's carrent energy
situadoes. Jt also told us how people
about oil WA Iss compasrsks.
answers. frankly. were not
estiritly flatun-Mg-
Canadlivis told us they
*whole energy
* thoroughlyconfus.
Rh different kinds
Nrisation Corning
lady the fedieral govern-
th, C.-` ment. trom pror4mad
A -01- U "id 8'... is.. it-.
A-C-4- 00.6-t media and from the tridus-
-,W "W- '-d -- - try. they sald Om Wrivily
.0 ..a chidn't know who to believe.
For the Canadian Petroleum A &=-tion, the
cimfusion surrounding the country's energy skitatson
presented an obvious challewc One Oat could bog
be met Owitigh an inforinabois program designed to
help people understarid moi e about the od and gas
aspect of energy.
A RudeAwakening
The second pan of our study pno-sirded a diffewit
kind cif problem. Canadians told us th" tbought we
were good at finding and producing oil and glass.
but not very good at consmunicating with Canadians.
The study suggested that we cared more abow
prow Ow about the country. That we fa wous ed the
west over other regions of Cana& And that that wiss
some doubt about our honesty and sinceirty.
Naturally, we than;
of the oismicas reveale
the study were not end
rate so we decided to I
with an information pr
This advertacment ail
in newspapers,
television represserit a I
step in that pi og. - m. As for Co-do- .6.0
honesty and sincerity. we think -0 d-.*d - IA, q@
people wig believe &M W.40x@ A. AV ~v
us if we de /W.4 9.
our best to provide acoalate dOW60-M - I* 0.7 Am
and helOul information. h@- W A~ 06M* m-
It's a ;srogram from which we
hope everybody will benefit. Am @- of the #-hM
Not a crisis. A dmilenge.
Right now. Canada is not confronted with an irrimmerst
imergy crisis, Six in the Willer turn we do face
the queam of security ni oil supply. It is possible for
Cana& to beconse oil wig sufficiesit in the years
ahead. But achieverrivit of that total "I be influenced
by decisions made now and in the near figure.
At the Canaidian Petroleum Assriciation. we believe
oil sell sufficiency for Canada is a challenge that must
be met because our national
security depends an it- this
But that cludlerip can only
be me when the mitiority
Of Cartisdians Agree to the
VW =W understand the
1111borsal commstonerst
required all the CV=blt 2ft
For dust reason, were
goinigtodisourbest to help
Canadians, urwerstand
more about the ad and gas ;Woe mwnd"r -fo*uo -w
F - , of the energy C@"WWr@?A#Vd*"ffW
itiaestion. TWS a commit- Pk,
ft- ..W I I 0 , Ts.
ment WL- plan to keep. A- M.
Because we believe ene. xi -nwipwhuvft=A
solutkina begin with lb. by a@ -d-"
understanding.
CANADLAN PEI ROLEUM ASSOCUMON.
Energy solutions beginMth understanding.
356
16
iv-tzetsooc
Columbia 14 April `1999
BATCo document for Province of British

Reacitait to the Campaign
The second ad was titled, 'We promised on television to help you
understand more about the oil and gas aspect of the energy question.
We're keeping that promise.' The ad argued that the world was expe-
riencing an oil glut, so there appeared to be no likelihood of immediate
shorLages, but Canadas post experience with revolutions and oil em-
barges should convince Canadians that they simply could not take things
for granted lExhibit 61.
The third ad was titled, 'This is the message the Canadian PeLro-
learn Association is taking to Parliament today.' The ad addressed dif-
ferent issues concerning NEP-what the energy security bills were all
about, a sober look at the National Energy Program, and the National
Energy Program's legacy of loss. The ad concluded with the notice that
the CPA was asking the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy
Legislation to take a now look at the National Energy Program (Exhibit
71.
Media Schedule
The CPA ran its print ads between October 31, 1981, and January 1982.
The total number of insertions for the entire campaign was 35 Using 20
different publications, as shown in the media schedule [Table 11.
REACTION TO THE CAMPAIGN
Press Reaction
The press had provided extensive coverage or NEP. However, there was
no perceptible coverage of the CPA campaign on the part or print or
broadcast media. Nor was there any change in the news media coverage
or NEP as a consequence of the CPA campaign. Noting the absence of
press mention. Ken Colby, a TV veteran, observed: -rhere is nothing to
editorialize about. What we have so far is the oil industry saying that
there is confusion on the energy issue, and that this confusion is bad.'
Government Reaction
There was no public reaction from the government either. Given the mild,
noncontroversial, nonassertive character of the ad copy, this lack of re-
action should not be surprising. Moreover, all CPA commercials were
shown to the minister of energy before they were aired. Colby comments:
We had nothing to disturb them (the governmentl and there
was nothing they could object to. I am sure them would have
been a strong reaction on the part of the government if we had
run a commercial saying that @w o- Lh of the price orgasolins
paid by the people at the gas pump goes to the government as
taxes.
357
he
BATCo document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Exhibit 6
We ed on television
to understand
more OR aspect
of the energy
WUre keeping ffiat prorruse.
N;,u II"%, have oeorn uptive,,booir I elev@isypn.
We're he Canadmi, Pelippleurno Amiox-sati,pro, and our
W.We t@ TII .4'vvttt y niormthorr cNoottliani" prm1we ilmoo, or
8M4 L.,Ill;Kll'% IN] and SMIUMI 9.1-
In a rocitoon-wooclestiotly.
we zi@ktrd CanailLans No-
,he,
felt arm the ctounuys
Current emnMy Situati-ML
You said ym fell aponofuwd
and frustrated and that ynu
wanted %,rate cleir and
MiXurate inkentuotwn.
We want I,- do, what we
CM [so help dear up woople
f.H..O- 1.6@ 'A -4 thc citilu-mir, -runionoi
rII1. I.,--- ..d -4 -Ir, ingtheenenzywit-Iti,on
Z" .4 _ @ J6,v too, _@
w@ re viorkirg top help lipto
J...4 understand empire 'he
-W., 11,@ .. lb, pA it and gasjutporti opt energy.
'the energy question
'nor I;i,-nlIerI rnerRy t1tirmicon i% really inatir up opt
N"NIV Iflor,16tow,. Ay, wor I.Kitig moovirtliair hontalp
1% (--III.KIM 1111 CIANXVI W
nomittim poll J.ioil 2"d sea-;?
Will ooproterval"mi, -Gave
.,ur problems' Are alter-
nale energypoopumvii readily
available to us?
Right mow. the world is
expornendrig an c*l glut IL
-j, there apr"rot b, be two
fikelihowd if immediate Rural M. jr-NO -i.
slNortattes Hiii our past.
expe least wilh revriu. &*a t- h.-hd bA.
ti,virs'aim.1 oil evit7a; NNI- Nyok, .Qd
qhonpld cy viiwe U we X_-A.,NI1,NN1 A. both
Rninpir Mn't take thimm ,A. J- IN
Zr Wm
-d .
VILL m,wr,, =Lo tio, @Aw
As to) whether tor mot Cattada is running toul opt oil
appol Caq. Ilic - atiswer I% yont aml two Ye- we are slowly
fail Mitriv ro"I"Nott -11 to thl 111,11
iI, rt-latively ori%y lop gei itut ro(the ground. least we Wive
other hind%, -I .41 IN No or ,@ I %amK it th,:- A roic and
Ix-rivath the craii n,vor. That kiml 14 ;11, h.i.evVr.
i-Silly 411frk-1111 W LIM OI -III91 MIN h N.poe -XIM-11.1vir to
get.II(
Will norcrvaimat @plvt- ,tit le,.61untO h ill cer.
tainly help bta jp,roi Ling Irrm tj%2" pnIftriiioris
and ;I cippotinuinit declute in tvitiWiviNnial ol tonductioron.
it no 1wroatible (#or L@iwtxLa lop )"wife -ell %opfficirtit in
il aml X,-m ,nly with flor.r4nonert ,f ate. peirpleurn
". 'Lirt".
Altorroutle etirrkv u*jrL%- III- hi.1.1 r"I li-rnme f-,r
Iho, future. fine that Iware I% rin-halils -rernl xorne
r-ON-ro, a". y 11 mopenro, them -it -and RI% %,II remain
moor prinutry energy v"n,ro-, wilil well ini-, the next
tilluoy
Ourenergy I iabiLs
Currently, lietorMortini acv.unt- to por an emitnated 58--nf
L;uontla-s Pep'"ary ertCI`1tY Fe4ulfenitntS. U111 aCCOUnU
((,r 40-- and natural gapt
p"rylorleit 18%
In 15980. Canada prop-
thired ahiNil 1.52 ovillimn
lNut I+. #if loil IR1 day.
title (.@Irmgllans C'"loturporl)
I.R7 millmn harrriq lper
day. The dilieteme as
troade up by cipstly torn.
pointed oil Our kru,wn P
reserves rof natural g;?-,. tila. - f-f-f.
Alh-kd
linwever. suggest that we zl@ I "INN'"
ill have enough tur our -._i -i oN, j...tv
impri needs pluR erhKish I,, -0 III., A., A- . d,,4N,Nqr
expect fnr many. ninny
Year, in
A Iii tic bit (if knowledge
Slorne M421C ,61Y a little IMI -if kipo,voledme can are a
clarojiterius (nine. Al fair CanmIL-iii I'vin,letim
Amrodatirpopt. we lk4iew a little bit if Itmowicdoite is an
ionpoortant horminnnig Obtimoool%. thipt adverti-ternent
antrio-ot Ofiltain orrop-tuth inbIntu, IN, 111axor Wj itn'till
arid u,-m rititt-orl. Itto we IN. 11 IUI- JOIR41 @I "I
tolderiolaild Intfraloomi thor
CIKM quer-dism
CANADLAN PEIROLELJM A QQOCLAJION.
Energy solutions begin with u"n"d@erstanding- C;@
C)
co
co
358
BATCo document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Tnis is the messa Exhibit 7
.ge the
Canadian Petroleum A@sociation
is liking tD parliament today.
Today. the Canadian PeinAeum industry and the nation's economy. projects. The
Association will beappear After 18 m(mtlL% the evidence is xpansion -
before the P21rhamenlaa 512tagnoding overwhelming that this has been has been
Coisinionet on Ener 'y g1slatioun. the mm.
TheAssmation pireuritto been abandoned,
[he Committee a =tlinmg the rdL7e has been
eurn rodustry's views an Ine Nafionial indefinitely and the
i Of C- 104. one of a series of Alsands is in dOLibt. At least three
posed Bills intended lo deal E other majur pnojects crucial to oil
energy sec-.jnty legislation. supply security have been
le;WopflroMa@s suspended or abandoned and
he major
WhattNEg,gy While the objectives of the National de=0721dorte di - ZY
uncertain bemuse (Td put
Semity Energy Program are laudable. the between governments.
consequences resulting from the Canada's econnomy, as a whole,
are aU about methods of implernentattion have has been affected lixi Some $7.4
been extremity damaging to the billion has flowed nut of Canada
mdusLry in particular, n a
ne Energ) Security Bills tum as a wittile. Consider "'i'
represent tl@e last pNise of imple- the following:
cou" acuv"M pro p
Mr9r.- by EiPI has
our
f
'he N
had - reg. .
mentation of the National bill ncz of P. w kiid
A @ this time. 18 Always The damage inflicted an the ou rotl@
d an f.::ed i"le"t
ktrulleum sector has reduced the
National Energy Program. the elihoud of a4hieving oil supply rates higher
Canadian Firtmieum Association security by 1990. Meariumile
feels it ap I since the introduction of the
Pr, priaie to take,stuck N.E.R. Canada'b a@ility to supply
and asse t -le -nents and mpact lh@2gs dork haw
of the N 5E! P its oil needs from domesec orti-
ductim has declined by 12% - tobeNsway.
a trend which has to be reversed.
Asob(ylook Since the intlmduction of the Jt has been said that Canada's
N.E.P.. more than 15.000 Jobs in reulturce industries can be the
at th he oil and psndustry ve been engine that drives the natio6s
eNa6onal r. pi. @ul scularly firie
laieoll@ .'ri., CM
F'rograrn, Quebec anti Virnugimitt Canada. healthy
Energy an . A )d it
Gveninw."illi are beavily (niting peir q; ularyoinituilie a
ary stated inient Will the public and IxtnJetint r
I'lior prince Hoolsoof mali c i i i motion (4) ectincinic
the Natunial t@neogy Frniparn were nidu in I he name of ly recovery for Lanaida.
to ensure nikupply security for The need for a healthy petroleum
Canada 211d t ) achieve SULIS=Llai indus4y has already been recoil.
Canadianimit on of the petnoleurn nized Hi Alberta. And the recent
;ndustry. Tht lari.:tl [,or fulfill. lon4ticers atiliooliby lwrtiverturient oil float
loctli. Uf tht-se tkieLlives Wab sel Null uil porlivintre will ciailrobuir in the
-it it from been holvvil. Yet v
. it. year lVM1 Thu U-mailLm indmslry'-;rvrt.vLTy
Pctnolcum Atm ocinix too bas lomg adually further awny frion 'it fits cifa licallby Ixtrioletan oinclustry
been tin recox.1 as suppiorting than Supply Security.
laudableubjectives. Canada's abilif v to develop its
With The intruducii(io of the conventitional uii reserves has Lh@liltyl
National Energy FruM. m. the beeii underomined. Sincie Wober professional jobs in every prn%nnce
cler2l government ;4so)cLiuvied 19M), stone 334 *I drilling and of C:muvJa. I fie benefits also accrue
the need ftpr a fairer. ur farm. lotervice riRs Nive left CirlikkI. to the axontry as a whole in the
liflare of Ow revenues guneratell The titunber of wells drilled in foron of a Sirtinge
,uni secure
frunt Canada's petroho 1981 dmvped by nitore than interest rall es rld It
Again, the Ciuiadiaii Petrtiletim 2,0(X) fortioi Ilse previous y;@r. discretionary . v.
Astionmatio)n w is tin 7 eawdas stimulate the retail sector of
suploitilliog A flare oluiLable andgas
disinbution.if revelluL. development hasalso suffered. 'T'ijda'y" '1hCr&i.n Pet..
Uind sales, which reflect expiu-
At the little of ties Nalional lewn Association is asking the
Energy 11ahrinin's intruduLlimi. the ration expeclatinns, do-toliped by
Canadian Petr,)Ieuni Assrxiation one third kom 1980 to 198 1.
expressed concem. fail[ [lie weral Geophysical wivtty - the fore-
govertiment's i evenue,oblect ves. ninner ni expkintitron dirilling -
and the nieas,i -es ch, @en it. imple went down as well.
InellL 0se.14 E.11, could prove Canada' 5 cm[ supply security Un
dairuiging tu @x-th the petroleum program is heavily dependent begin with energy. C)
CD
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BATCo document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999

Cuituduvi Petroleum Assmiation: To Change Attitudes and Influence Government
Table I Canadian Petroleum Association 1981-82
Advertising, October 1981-February 1982,
English Canada. Magazine Campaign
Number
Publication Scheduled Date Insertior
Financial Post Oct- 31 1
Maclean's Oct. 12. 19/Nov. 2, 16 4
Quest Nov./Dec. 2
Saturday Night Nov, I
rime Oct. IS/Nov. 2.16,23,30 5
Atlantic Insight Nov./Vec. 2
Hamilton Magazine Nov./Dec. 2
Montreal Calendar Nov./Dec. 2
Ottawa Magazine Nov./Dec. 2
Toronto Calendar Nov /Dec. 7
Toronto Life Nov.
Vancouver Calendar Nov./Um 2
Business Beat Nov./Dec. I
tiarrowsmith Nov- I
Racquets Canada Nov. I
Ski Canada Nov. I
Travelife Nov. 15 I
Chimo Nov-/Feb. 2
Energy Magazine Nov. I
Equinox Jan. I
Public Reaction
From We very beginning of Ute development of a campaign 3trategy
there was a great deal of controversy among CPA members about Lb-
overall thrust of the campaign and Its execution. There was a fr;rlioi
between the staff and the voting membership because the letter ;ho
rized spending end controlled the budget. Many or thorn would have like(
to have more of an advocacy campaign and less of an image or infor
motion campaign. And because of that, there was a great deal of effor,.
from the people who had done the research to convince the supervising
committee members to go the lonj way around in order to be successful
The staff people who were closely involved In the day-to-day man-
agement or the campaign felt that the voting members were not the au-
dience the campaign was targeted at. Alan Gregg commented:
We have to spend a lot of time saying to them people: 'Gentle-
men, you're not really the market that we are after. And while
you may cost your vote to satisfy your gut reaction, it will not
work- It we have to put commercials on the air to please you.
then we are looking at entirely the wrong markets and we are
probably not going to be very successful.'
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ment for Province of BritiSh Columbia 14 April 11999
BATCO docu

Rca,, tik-ti to fhe Campaign
Ken Colby added:
It is a general frustration. The industry generally would
like to say that people are being Screwed around by their gov.
ernment. And it is going to cost us all. It is going to cost us
jobs. It is going to cost us exports. So there is a frustration in
a campaign that is moving too Slowly; that it is too soft- My
own intuition is that you are better off moving incrementally
rather than coming out with all your guns blazing. During the
build-up stage you are establishing credibility. You are esLab-
lishing spokesmonship. My personal preference would be to go
out and hit people over the head. However, I have come to the
conclusion that this is probably a safer and ultimately more
effective way. Therefore I am committed to it. While the senior
executives of companies involved in the CPA might wish in their
heart of hearts that We should go out and beat pvernmen t over
the head-they do recognize that they can't. The campaign is
going the way it is. They have to do everything that they can
to reinforce it.
There will always be public distrust as long as you are
making large prorits. There is distrust of all institutions. If there
is as much distrust of government as or the oil industry, you
havc won. The iden in simply to put Lhu oil imfustry buck on
an equal (noting wiLh other institutions. The Imst that yins can
hope ror is Lo have a neutral public opinion.
Between 1980 and 1984 there has been a considerable change in
attitudes toward business and government interaction. Specifically, Ca-
nadians are now much more willing to believe that private industry is
more efficient. inexpensive, and trustworthy in ensuring and supplying
oil and gas to the public than is government [Exhibit 81. While the ac-
tual percentage of people who chose business has decreased slightly in
the past year, this is not picked up as a gain for govemmenL What has
occurred instead is an increase in the percentage or people who volun-
teered 'neither."
Furthermore, a majority of Canadians (65 percent) believe that in-
dustry in general has a major responsibility for changing government
Policy, and an additional 26 percent believe it has a minor responsibility.
Thew perceptions of business responsibility are also transferred to a per-
ception by a majority of Canadians that the oil and gas industry spe-
cirically has a major responsibility to try to change the government pol-
icy affecting it. Any attempt by the industry to change government pol-
icy would be viewed as helping either "a great deal" (22 percent) or "a
bit' (41 percent). while only 14 percent believe it would hurt. However,
fewer people (48 percent) are likely to believe that industry having the
final say would help the country either 'a great deal' (16 percent) or 'a
bit' (32 percent), while a core of people believe it would hurt either 'a
bit' (17 percent) or "a great deal" (13 percent).
The beat situation appears to be the oil and gas industry and the
government combining to come up with an energy policy; indeed, 84 per-
cent believed it would help the country, and 54 percent of the total pop-
ulation believed it would help 'a great deal.' CPA studies show that
Canadians are most likely to believe that the most benefit to Canada
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Exhibit 8
Reliance on Business or Government
Be Government
E3 Business
95.2
$0.3 66,5 67.3
64 2 54.8
52
47.6 46.7
7i Is 5.5
39.6
34.3 38 34
34.1
septiso WM Oct= OWN Oc W septmo Oct= Ocm
Trustworthy EfrKient Inexpensive
would come rrorn industry and government working LogtAher La rorm an
energy policy. Indeed, the result of this joint effort would be or help to
the consumer.
Since the inception of the nationwide campaign in 1980, CPA h
tracked, through survey research, specific measurable goals that werv
set up as part or the original strategy. An examination or the goals in-
dicate that improvements in the industry imnge (phase 1) have contin-
ued, although there was little change in the 1982-83 period. The largest
mingle change was 'managed by Canadians.' Moreover, there appear to
be incremental chanpa in the phase 11 goals of public benefits associ-
ated with the industry. There has also been relatively little change in
the knowledge issue, which constitutes phase III goals, with a gap con-
tinuing to exist in understanding the energy situation. Considerable
progress has been made in the area of the public's awareness of the price
breakdown vis-a-vis government and industry. Finally, while confidence
in the industry goals of phase IV has improved, the public is slightly
less confident and, as we saw earlier, slightly more likely to have con-
fidence in neither industry nor government, although the percentage is
low [Table 21.
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Reaction to the Campaign
Table 2 Measurable Goals
Sept. 1980-
Sept. Apr. Feb. Oct. Oct. OcL 1983
1980 1981 1982 1982 1983 Change Goal
Phase I
Honest 32% 46% 55% 57% 54% 22% 60%
Communicate witri public 32 39 42 41 40 8 51
Accountable 42 - 61 62 61 19 51
Contribute to Canada 61 71 72 75 73 12 80
Managed by Canadians 27 46 54 Ss 53 26 60
Trast - 46 58 58 57 II, 60
Hear of CPA 45 51 48 - - -
Phase 11
Create$ jobs - so 81 78 79 -1. 90
Favors one region 39 41 45 47 52 13 60
Industrial growth - 73 70 74 -14 so
Secunng supply - 63 69 70 73 10, 75
Industry rating IX 6.17 5.12 5.49 5.53 5.43 -.74 6.25
Phase IH
No one's telling the truth 68 64 66 66 72 4 40
Industry sets price 17 21 19 14 13 -4 5
X% or energy imported - 38 37 39 - - 34
X% of profits reinvested 37 34 37 37 34 3 -
Share of pnce to
government 27 28 56 65 69 42 40
Responsibility for
situation (government) - 61 63 64 58 -3* 70
Blame ror situation
(government) - 35 40 43 - - so
Phase FV
Trust business 35 39 49 55 48 13 60
Efricient business 46 53 61 65 60 14 60
Inexpensive business 38 44 53 60 57 19 60
Social contract
believability - 26/26 - - - - 40/40
Closer to world price - 37 48 53 - 70
Favor takeover - 68 - - - 90
'April 1981 -October 1983 percent change report*&
Note- Dasnes indicate the question was naL asked in that survey.
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Canadian Petroleum Association: To Change Attitudes and Influence Government
Decima Research analyzed the measurable goals to discover the rel-
ative importance of the attitudinal variable in predicting levels of in-
dustry approval. The results indicated that the following variables had
the strongest association with overall assessment or the industry:
Contribution to economic growth
The way the industry communicates with government
The industry's ability Im get oil and gas to consumers
The industry's trustworthiness
These factors indicate that public opinion has indeed changed frorn
a concern for the "personality' of the industry in 1980. for its perfor.
mance expressed through such issues as the price of its products, taxes,
and prorits in 1982, to current concerns about how the industry can con-
tribute to Canada's economic growth now that the public views the econ-
omy as "turning the corner' and how it can cooperate with government
and consumers.
Awareness of CPAs Ads
To test the awareness levels and believability of CPA's ads, Decima Re-
search conducted a panel study in Toronto from March to June 1984.
Nine hundred people were set up as a control panel in March, and then
300 of that panel were reinterviewed in late June in their homes. The
study found recognition levels of the CPA advertisements to be higher
than in previous studies, with the highest attributed to "exploration.'
However, there also appeared to be some ralloff in terms of sponsor
awareness. Nevertheless, CPA ads had a wider reach than before. with
more people saying they saw the advertisements.
The panel survey was designed to assess individual attitude change
when people could prove that they recognized the ads in comparison to
people who did not recognize the ads. Study results indicated that them
was relatively little 'net' change in attitudes over the three-month pe-
riod. Finally, panel results indicated that people who were aware or the
CPA sponsorship were more likely to hold either stable pro-industry views
or switch to pro-industry opinions.
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BATCO document for Province of British Columbia 14 April 1999